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In the course of 2018, automotive players had to tackle a variety of challenges 
within its business environment. BMW was no exception. Given such 
circumstances, the purpose of this report is to assess BMW’s intrinsic valuation. 
Likewise, both a quantitative and qualitative analysis were performed whilst 
regarding the shape of the future of mobility. Upon our considerations, a BUY 
recommendation is reached on top of three major pillars: unstoppable mobility 
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● A key position in the electrification landscape. BMW holds 
as the #3 worldwide brand in terms of combined deliveries of 
all-electric and plug-in vehicles. BMWi3 is the only premium 
car present in the top 10 most sold compact-EV models 
globally. As a 50% global EV adoption rate is expected by 
2035, our forecasts translate into a CAGR of 13.95% of 
increased total deliveries of electrics and others. 
● A privileged stance in China. As customers develop deeper 
loyalty to brands in the growing Chinese car market, leading 
autos are taking as nearly as 80% market share. BMW is 
stated as a preferred EU brand, well-positioned to capture the 
growth opportunities in a market expected to grow at a CAGR 
of 3.68%. Additionally, BMW’s top luxury vehicles are gaining 
favour amongst ultra-high-net-worth Chinese customers. 
● Shaping the future of shared mobility. BMW holds a 
favoured positioning to prevail as a mobility leader, through the 
development of future-oriented products and services, such as 
the ones promoted in the collective 1 billion joint ventures with 
Daimler. Such is crucial for securing future revenue streams, 
increasing brand loyalty and sales retention. 
● Well placed to mitigate the risks from possible trade 
conflict. With the recent announcement of the additional 25% 
acquisition of BMW Brilliance, the Group will be the first foreign 
carmaker to take control of its joint venture company in China. 
This deal will help BMW lessen the impact of higher tariffs 
imposed during the trade fight, as it now plans to boost 
manufacturing capacity in China and expand local production 
of models, including electric cars. 
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(Values in € millions) 2018 2019E 2020F 
Revenues 97,480 96,008 99,838 
EBIT 10,201 8,050 8,340 
NOPLAT 5,071 3,638 3,904 
Net Income 7,240 5,503 5,794 
FCF -3,182 2,812 2,475 
Total Assets 196,987 199,676 204,465 
Total Equity 57,559 58,025 59,037 
EPS 11.01 8.37 8.81 
ROIC 20.19% 12.86% 14.78% 
EBIT Margin 10.46% 8.39% 8.35% 
EV/EBIT 13.50x 14.63x 11.77x 
Source: Analyst Estimations 
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The creation of BMW traces back to 1916, with the merger of Flugmaschinenfabrik 
Gustav Otto, an aircraft manufacturer, into Bayerische Flugzeug-Werke AG (BFW AG). 
In 1917, Rapp Motorenwerke, another aircraft manufacturer, was restructured into 
Bayerische Motoren Werke GmbH (BMW AG). Finally, in 1922, BMW was bought by 
the owners of BFW. Today, the Group consists mainly of three premium vehicle brands, 
BMW, MINI and Rolls-Royce, and produces more than nineteen different models of 
automobiles and eight of motorcycles. It is subdivided into three operating segments: 
Automotive, Motorcycles and Financial Services. Additionally, the company registers 
the values for holding companies and the Group’s financing companies in the “Other 
Entities” segment.  
The automaker is best known for producing premium BMW automobiles and 
motorcycles, but it was only in 1923 that BMW produced its first motorcycle, until then 
the company was specialized in jet engines. It was not until 1928, with the acquisition of 
Fahrzeugfabrik Eisenach, that the company became an automaker. BMW Group’s 
resilience and innovation mindset helped shape the company into being one of the 
most recognized worldwide premium car and motorcycle manufacturers. In 2019, 
the company ranked third in terms of sales, among the biggest German automakers, 
behind Daimler AG and Volkswagen Group, with 2.10 million cars delivered. The 
company's revenue has been growing since the subprime crisis in 2008 and 2009, with 
an associated CAGR of 5.45%. Sales growth has slowed down (for the last five years 
CAGR equals 3.93%), yet this fall, new registrations show it was felt industry-wide 
(approximately 6.80%). The cars that suffered the most were diesel cars, whose sales 
fell by 30%, mainly due to growing environmental concerns and fear of future tougher 
restrictions to combustion engine vehicles. However, as BMW was, in 2018, the 
worldwide number one brand in terms of combined deliveries of all-electric and 
plug-in hybrid vehicles, this might be good news. From 2010 to 2018, the Group’s 
automotive unit sales rose from 1.46 million to 2.49 million units, from which 142,617 
(5.70%) were electric and hybrid vehicles (103,080 units in 2017, +38.40%). To highlight, 
BMW plug-in hybrid models were the ones to contribute the most to this 
performance, with a total of 91,853 units delivered (2017: 63,605 units; +44.40%). 
Meanwhile, deliveries of the electrified MINI Countryman, available since June 2017, 
totalled 13,219 units (2017: 5,799 units; +127.95%). Regarding the motorcycle segment, 
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BMW sales growth has been driven mainly by the fast-growing emerging markets 
such as China, which already represents 25.70% of automotive unit sales, with 640,803 
units delivered in 2018 (2017: 595,020 units, +7.70%), making it the single largest market 
for BMW.  
BMW’s shares are quoted on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The BMW Group stock 
performance saw a downfall in 2018 due to political uncertainties, such as trade 
disputes and instability in Europe. The main investor uncertainty sources were the risk 
of an increase in tariffs between both the EU, China and the United States, Brexit and 
general automakers decrease in EBIT margin. In fact, BMW was particularly exposed to 
the uncertainty of a possible trade war, as it is a large exporter of vehicles from the 
US to China, (approximately 100,000 vehicles shipped in 2018). Nevertheless, the 
company is countering this exposure by increasing their share of BMW Brilliance, 
making it the first foreign company taking control of its Chinese joint venture, responsible 
for the production of BMW vehicles sold in China. Additionally, the EBIT margin of BMW 
decreased from 10.07% (9.20% on the Automotive segment)1 in 2017 to 9.36% (7.20% 
on the Automotive segment). This decrease in EBIT margin of the overall company and 
most importantly, the automotive segment, puts the company’s future profitability at risk. 
Nonetheless, the Group’s cost-cut plan – which will be further discussed ahead – will 
play a key role in mitigating this exposure. Automakers upfront expenditures in new 
technologies and the new emission standards also contributed to the weakening of the 
Automobile Index, which fell by 27.20% in 2018. Despite following the market’s 
negative trend, BMW Group’s common stock outperformed the sector index, with a 
price decrease of 18.60% since the beginning of the year and a closing price of 70.70 
EUR (86.83 EUR in 2017). The preferred stock registered a similar downfall of 16.80%, 
closing at 62.10 EUR per share (74.64 EUR in 2017).  BMW Group’s market 
capitalization is now 47.78 billion EUR, being amongst the ten most valuable German 
enterprises listed on the stock market. 
BMW automotive segment revenues have seen a slight decrease (-0.90%) in the first 
quarter (Q1) of 2019, followed by a more significant increase (+2.90%) in Q2 and Q3 
(+7.90%)2. Although BMW has performed better in terms of unit sales when 
compared to its most direct competitors, it did not outperform Daimler in terms of 
revenues’ growth for the first two quarters: Daimler (Q1: +0.00%; Q2: +4.60%; Q3: 
+7.60%). BMW did, yet, outperform Audi (Q1: -9.80%; Q2: -5.70%; Q3: -6.80%). The 
company has recently changed CEO, from Harald Krueger to Oliver Zipse, thus the third 
quarter, first quarter under the charge of the new CEO, had investors’ attention. The 
company surpassed expectations, with not only revenue growth exceeding that of its 
 
1 Values considered before reformulation. 
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main competitor for the first time in a couple of quarters, but also an outstanding 
32.90% jump in EBIT when compared to Q3 2018. The revenue growth is mainly due 
to the successful luxury segment and the increased customers’ adherence to 
certain high margin models such as the new BMW X vehicles (+23.10%), the popular 
BMW 3 Series Sedan (+33.70%) and Touring (+21.60%). Additionally, customers 
interest in electrified vehicles is continuing to grow. For November, sales of BMW 
Group’s EV models, namely plug-in hybrid models, rose by +20.30%, with an emphasis 
on the BMW i series (+18%) and the new Mini electric (+50%), on a YTD vision. EV 
sales increased by 2.30%. Another factor contributing to these positive results is the 
recent cost-cutting initiative, that will be further discussed, yet the company is far from its 
target profit margin of 8%, with only 6.60% in Q3 2019. 
In turn, Rolls-Royce has experienced fast growth in unit sales for all quarters of 2019 
(Q1: +49.40%; Q2: +36.30%; Q3: +41.60%), following the positive trend already 
experienced in 2018 - year when the record of 4,107 units delivered was achieved. This 
success is mainly due to increased sales in the Chinese market, which became Rolls-
Royce’s second-largest market and is expected to rise to #1 anytime soon. The brand’s 
top luxury vehicles are gaining favour amongst ultra-high-net-worth Chinese 
customers, who are willing to pay for the extra personalisation options and 
comfort. In fact, Phantom, Rolls-Royce’s most expensive model (approximately 
550,000 USD) has more sales in China than anywhere else in the world. 
b. Shareholder Structure 
The shareholder structure of BMW is relatively concentrated, with fixed holdings 
accounting for 46.80% of shares. The two largest shareholders, Stefan Quandt 
(25.83%) and Susanne Klatten (20.90%), are siblings and hold 30.30% of the 
company’s voting rights. After the passing of their mother, Johanna Quandt, Susanne 
was awarded the voting rights of 49.30 million BMW shares (approximately 12.70%), 
and Stefan with the voting rights for 50.70 million BMW shares (circa 17.60%). The newly 
attained shares give Stefan Quandt a “blocking minority” in the BMW Group, worth 13.40 
million EUR. The remaining 53.20% of shares are publicly traded. This includes 
shareholdings below 5%, which are not entitled to vote, and thus are considered as free 
float. In terms of the geographical distribution of institutional equity investors, there is a 
clear predominance of European (58.40%) and North American (35.50%) investors. 
Note that institutional holdings represent 266 million ordinary and preferred shares out 
of 658 million outstanding shares. 
 
3 Controlled company whose voting rights belong to Stefan Quandt. 
4 Controlled company whose voting rights belong to Stefan Quandt. 
5 Controlled company whose voting rights belong to Susanne Klatten. 
Free Float 53,2% 
AQTON SE investments3 9% 
AQTON GmbH & Co. KG 
investments4 16,6% 
Susanne Klatten Beteiligungs 
GmbH5 20,7% 
Susanne Klaten 0,2% 
Stefan Quandt 0,2% 
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Exhibit 7: Rolls-Royce Sales 
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c. Business Model 
The BMW Group operates exclusively on the premium segment, but its core brand 
services a wide range of customers from environmentally conscious to high-
performance enthusiasts. This requires the company to focus on innovation, 
sustainability and on the ideal “vehicle of the future”. The Group is committed to 
developing future-oriented vehicles and services, targeting topics such as electric 
mobility, digitalization and autonomous driving. Regarding the latter, BMW plans to 
provide highly automated driving by 2021. Meanwhile, the company has continuously 
developed seamless digital services, such as personalized and context-based 
information within the vehicle, virtual reality options to configure one’s car, and an 
intelligent platform that will facilitate switching vehicles based on one’s customer profile. 
Another strategic investment concerns the energy efficiency of both automobiles and 
motorcycles. The development of top technology combustion engines and lightweight 
construction allows for reduced fuel consumption and vehicle emissions.  
In a tentative to safeguard its profit margin, BMW has been working on a cost-cutting 
initiative, Performance > NEXT, since 2017 which has already proven to be fruitful. 
Looking at the Q3 2019 results, BMW’s EBIT margin for automotive increased from 
4.40% to as high as 6.60% YTD. The Group has been extending its efforts towards this 
initiative in recent quarters, by taking measures that will save the company more than 12 
billion EUR by 2022. Firstly, the company is aiming towards reducing product 
complexity and adopting more flexible vehicle architectures, by dropping half of the 
traditional drivetrain and gearbox combinations in the next two years. In light of product 
simplifications and increased use of software simulation, new vehicle development is 
undergoing a significant efficiency boost. Namely, the development times of new 
vehicles are expected to decrease by one-third. Moreover, digital simulations and 
virtual validation can still phase out the need for approximately 2,500 prototype 
vehicles by 2024.  
Additionally, as the company plans to sustain a diversified vehicle offer, current plants 
are being adapted to sustain the flexible production of combustion, fully electric, and 
plug-in hybrid vehicles. These structural changes are expected to decrease overheads 
and reduce the management board size by one person (from eight to seven). 
Moreover, BMW plans to keep the workforce at the same level as 2018. Thus, to 
compensate for the hiring of skilled specialists, the staff force was reduced by 1,500 
through mandatory early retirement. There is still the possibility to let go of 2,500 staff 
members, further restricting workforce costs. Still regarding workforce-related efforts, the 
sales division was reformulated in April 2019, to combine the three Group’s brands, 
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Overall, the company aims to achieve an EBIT margin between 8% and 10% for both 
automotive and motorcycle segments and a ROE of 14% on the Financial Services 
segment. Nonetheless, in our view, these expectations are over-optimistic for the 
automotive segment - even though we recognise the efficiency of this cost-cutting 
initiative. Therefore, in our model we consider a 7% EBIT margin for autos to prevail in 
the future. Note that a 3.10% average EBIT margin was observed in the global auto 
industry in 2018, which has been following a downtrend. BMW has been able to maintain 
a certain degree of profitability, both by taking advantage of its premium status and 
through innovative cost-cutting initiatives, such as the one described above. In the case 
of motorcycles, we believe BMW will meet expectations, hence keeping an 8.60% EBIT 
margin in the long run. 
Automotive Market 
a. Overview 
The automotive industry, one of the world’s largest economic sectors by revenue, has a 
significant role in the global economy and is the most important segment for BMW6. It 
has been growing at consistent and relatively robust positive figures, particularly after the 
2008 financial crisis. An attractive combination of high-volume growth, a product mix 
that favours higher-margin vehicles and the breakthrough of the Asia Pacific - 
mostly China - were among the major drivers. 
China took the centre stage in recent years and soon became a key market. Nowadays 
nearly 30% of global industry profits come from the region and it is the single largest 
market for BMW, which holds a privileged position in the country. Even with car sales 
in the Chinese market decreasing in 2018 (-3.12%), for the first time in decades, 
BMW was capable of presenting a near two-digit positive growth (+7.70%). As the 
Chinese auto market gets more concentrated and demanding, BMW has been able to 
position itself as a preferred European brand, not only premium but also luxury. 
Moreover, the Group has maintained its robust position in the region despite a recent 
cool-down of the market attributed to weak credit growth, a rise in used car sales and 
new emissions standards. 
Amid this slowdown in Chinese demand, structural environmental concerns over diesel 
cars and the growth of the sharing economy, 2018 revealed the first negative figure since 
the 2008 financial crisis for global car sales. Total global sales amounted to 60.82 million 
cars (2017: 64.43 million cars; -5.60%)7, with the first signs of a slowdown becoming 
evident. A downtrend in global demand is one of the major bottlenecks. The demand for 
 
6 In 2018 automotive revenues corresponded to 70.73% of the Group’s revenues. 
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personal cars can be estimated through the change in population and the average RCP8, 
while the demand for service cars can be assessed through an analogous rate, the RR9. 
Trends such as e-hailing and car-sharing are perceived by the market as a threat, 
which ultimately has resulted in many pessimistic views regarding the sector. Figures 
point out that, on average, every shared car takes 9 vehicles out of the road10. 
Nevertheless, even though these services negatively influence the RCP (which 
decreases with demand) there is also the other side of the coin. Fewer cars per person 
mean each car is further exploited. So, the RR increases, which has an opposing effect 
(as the RR increases so does demand). Shared cars are used approximately 6 times 
more than a regular vehicle. It is estimated that shared engines are used 3 hours per 
day, on average, versus the 35 minutes of a privately-owned car. In our model, we reflect 
an average of 2.5 years of useful life for a shared automotive11 when compared to the 
15 years of useful life of a typical Internal Combustion (IC) vehicle. This implies a higher 
RR. For this reason, we still expect global car sales to continue to grow, although at 
a lower rate (~2%) when compared to the average growth of the last five years 
(3.60%)12. The evolution of the RCP and RR per geography will be further discussed 
ahead in the report, as it depends on each region’s consumer preferences, regulation 
and willingness to adopt the solutions of the future of mobility.  
Nonetheless, we believe this growth will be differently captured depending on the 
positioning of each player in the sharing mobility segment. It can be a deal-breaker for 
players that do not adapt accordingly in such a fast-paced environment. The auto-
players best positioned to meet consumer preferences in this sharing economy 
trend will be the ones more capable of benefiting from the positive effect of an 
increasing RR. BMW and Daimler recent cooperation, that comprises five joint 
ventures, shows the urge of both players to do so. This partnership ranges from 
autonomous driving to car-sharing and parking aids and combines the efforts of 14 
successful brands. The service already benefits from a pool of 60 million active users 
and has high profitability prospects. With this network of joint ventures, BMW and 
Daimler are successfully tackling the major trends in the industry. For this reason, we are 
optimistic BMW will prevail as a relevant player in the future of mobility, capable of 




8 Rate of Cars per Person (Passenger Vehicles in Use / Total Population). 
9 Rate of Replacement (Destroyed Cars / Passenger Vehicles in Use). 
10 Source: SHARE NOW, by BMW and Daimler. 
11 We assume shared vehicles to be driven 8 hours per day at a speed of 30 km/h. 
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b. The Future of Mobility 
Individual mobility is being reshaped. Trends such as digitalisation, connectivity, 
cooperation, electrification and regulations are deemed to revamp it. Their impact on 
demand, global sales and EBIT margin will be determinant for the industry 
attractiveness and profitability.  
Digitalisation & Connectivity: As Harald Kruger mentioned in BMW’s 2018 Annual 
Report: “Digitalisation is changing every industry and every aspect of our lives.” As such, 
digitalisation and connectivity are perceived as a key trend and a top priority13. 
Connected vehicles provide autos with the opportunity to establish beneficial 
relationships with customers over the entire ownership cycle and secure future 
revenue streams. Market leaders will require seamless, individualised, safe and on-
demand human-machine interfaces (CASE14). The global automotive market is 
already revealing a rise in the adoption of connected vehicles. The largest markets 
for connected car sales are China (32%), US (13%), Germany (11%) and UK (9%) - all 
primary markets for BMW. 
In this sense, we believe BMW holds a favoured positioning to prevail as a mobility leader 
for the premium car segment. It is worth highlighting the Group’s recent partnership with 
Daimler, which provides five different services. These will allow BMW to further engage 
with actual consumers and potentially new ones. At the end of the day, the brand is in 
contact with the premium segment but also the mass market. REACH NOW app offers 
multimodal services – customers can buy transport tickets from many providers and 
choose between car, taxi or bike-sharing. CHARGE NOW offers cross-border fast-
charging stations for EVs (fully charged car-battery in 30 minutes). FREE NOW provides 
a taxi ride-hailing service that includes micro-mobility options, such as e-scooters. PARK 
NOW allows customers to pay meters through the phone and find and reserve parking 
spots. Lastly, SHARE NOW is a car-sharing provider with several EVs options. The 
conglomerate of services is addressing the new consumers’ preferences in the paradigm 
of shared mobility - in particular in dense urban environments, that proactively 
discourage private car usage. It is important to notice that any consumer in an urban 
area can easily access these services, as they are not exclusively directed to the 
premium segment. 
Having said this, we expect up to one out of ten cars sold in 2030 to be a shared 
vehicle. Evidence shows a decrease in the importance of private car ownership in 
detriment for shared mobility. In the US, the percentage of driver licences15 dropped from 
 
13 Source: KMPG 2019 Automotive Executive Survey. 
14 Connected, autonomous, shared and electric. 
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76% (2000) to 71% - while the number of car-sharing in North America and Germany 
has grown by more than 30% annually over the last five years.  
On the bright side, according to McKinsey and Stanford, connectivity services16 and 
feature upgrades could expand automotive revenue pools by as much as 30%, 
adding up to 1.50 trillion USD in potential revenue by 2030. When comparing these 
values to the 5.20 trillion USD from traditional car sales and respective products and 
services, one can say this potential is significant. Together these revenues could 
accelerate annual automotive industry growth to 4.4% (2010 to 2015: 3.6%) – a 
higher engagement with the final consumer and consequential enhanced brand loyalty 
is the main argument.  
Having said this, we believe these alternative sources of revenue will mitigate the 
lower car selling prices practiced for car sharing purposes. Thus, we deem that 
BMW will be capable of maintaining its current average revenue per car. Additionally, 
these services will allow BMW and Daimler, to promote the sale of their vehicles - 
hence benefiting from the previously mentioned increase in RR and sustaining their 
market shares on the geographies they currently operate in. When thinking of a car-
hailing service such as Uber, for example, an Uber driver might choose whichever car 
brand to drive. For BMW-Daimler, all five services are exclusive to their Group brands. 
This exclusivity will be key for brand loyalty and sales retention, minimizing 
cannibalization. Lastly, note that both BMW and Mercedes-Benz are the preferred 
brands in China, which is the geography more prone to adopt connected vehicles and 
the one with the highest growth opportunities. 
Electric Mobility: The global EV industry has accomplished major achievements in a 
short time, driven by regulatory pressure, strong technical innovation in batteries 
and a great investment in EV platforms. In 2018, EV sales reached 2 million units 
globally (+63% YoY), with a stable ratio of battery electric vehicles to plug-in hybrids. 
Despite EV’s global penetration rate still being 2.2%, we expect a rapid acceleration 
to take place, mostly driven by regulation and consumer preferences towards less 
polluting and carbon-free alternatives. Plus, we expect BMW to remain as a top player 
in the field. The Group is investing in transforming their product mix, to include 25 
electrified vehicles, of which more than half will be fully electric models by 2023. 
Electric and plug-in hybrid car sales for BMW grew at a CAGR of 51.63% from 2014 to 
2018, and by the end of 2018 electrified vehicles represented a proxy of 6% of the 
Group’s total automotive deliveries.  
 
16 Such as Telematics (technology of sending, receiving and storing information via telecommunication devices in 
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BMW is part of a successful partnership, IONITY, founded as a joint venture between 
four of the biggest carmakers: BMW Group, Daimler AG, Ford Motor Company and 
Volkswagen Group. IONITY was created to power EVs all over Europe by constructing 
and operating several high-performance battery charging stations17. This progress 
allowed BMW to strengthen its position in EV deliveries. Likewise, we forecast BMW’s 
electrified cars sales to correspond to a proxy of 53% of the Group’s automotive total 
deliveries by 2030 and to 73% by 2035. For the car industry overall, we expect a 50% 
adoption rate by 2035. Thus, our figures reflect our belief that BMW will be at the forefront 
of the EVs market and capable of capturing a higher slice of the market. From 2019 to 
2035, our forecasts translate into CAGR of 13.95% of increased total deliveries of 
electrics and others (e.g. Hydrogen cars). Keeping in mind the higher costs associated 
with EVs, we also acknowledged the higher price-mix of these vehicles. We believe 
these prices should stabilize towards current diesel car prices by 2025.  
Meanwhile, regarding electrification, it is important to recognise its adoption varies across 
geographies and influences the Group’s product-mix. The European EV market has 
experienced moderate growth in 2018 (+90,000 units), despite individual cross-
country disparities between the Nordic countries and typically large markets. In Europe, 
Norway perseveres ahead of other markets and it is close to mass market adoption (40% 
market share), followed by Iceland (17%) and Sweden (7%). On the other hand, large 
markets such as Germany, France and the UK, keep lagging behind, with EV market 
shares of ~2%. Nevertheless, countries such as Germany aim to change this paradigm. 
The government of Angela Merkel proposed to ban new diesel car sales as soon as 
2030, in order to incentivise the adoption of EVs. Also, subsidies will be extended into 
five years, to 2025. Nevertheless, even though we believe the government will be 
successful in implementing this measure, we perceive 2030 to be too ambitious. 
Likewise, in our model, BMW’s deliveries in Germany will only be fully non-diesel by 2035 
- a five-year delay similar to the current extension of the German subsidies for non-IC. 
The possible structural barriers, such as the 25 billion EUR cost for the country’s power 
grid update, were also taken into account. Still in Europe, we think the UK would be 
capable of meeting its 2040 new diesel car sales ban in due time. Therefore, by 2035 a 
proxy of 75% of BMW’s deliveries in the UK will be non-IC vehicles. 
Looking at the US, the market roughly doubled its EV sales to 360,000 units, mainly 
due to Tesla’s Model 3. In 2018, for the first time in the US, an EV model sold as much 
as an IC one – showcasing EVs can be attractive alternatives to gas-powered cars for 
premium and mass-premium buyers. Nevertheless, sustainable market growth in the US 
will rely on regulatory developments regarding the rollback of 2025 fuel-economy 
 
17 As a result of the IONITY partnership, more than 400 charging points are expected to be implemented by 2020. 
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standards, as well as state authority under the Clean Air Act. As we see incentives in the 
US not being as high as in EU countries, we considered that only 50% of BMW’s 
deliveries in the region would correspond to non-IC engines, amid a lower adoption 
of electrified mobility. 
Lastly, the Chinese EV market grew 85% over 2018 - quite above the industry average. 
The market experienced healthy growth, regardless of a subsidy cut by the government 
early that year. Standing at 1.10 million units, representative of 51% of global EV sales 
in 2018, China’s EV market is now about three times the size of the EU and US 
markets individually. Additionally, some provinces in China, like Hainan, plan to ban 
the sale of new diesel cars as soon as 2030. The Republic of Taiwan also proposes a 
ban, but only for 2040. Plus, the “China VI” vehicle emission standards are one of the 
world’s strictest rules on automobile pollutants and will be fully applicable from 
January 2020. Compared with the "National V" standards, the new rules demand 
substantially fewer pollutants and the introduction of limits on particles. Despite tougher 
rules, the market is accomplishing a smooth transition. Chinese authorities have 
announced that the tax exemptions on new EV purchases will continue through 2020 to 
boost the country's green development and retain a strong domestic market. Alike 
Germany’s situation, we believe the 2030 deadline to be too ambitious, even for such a 
fast-paced country. Hence, in our model, we reflect the full adoption of electrified vehicles 
only by 2040. It is important to notice that China’s support for EVs has been fading out, 
with subsidies being cut entirely by 2020. Therefore, the growth rate of adoption for EVs 
should slow down. 
c. Market Analysis by Geography 
In order to fully understand the outlook for the automotive industry and, particularly for 
BMW, it is important to take a geographical perspective on demand - through the 
development of the RCP, RR, market share and electrification. 
Germany: Germany is one of the primary markets for BMW, representing 12.46% of 
the Group’s total deliveries in 2018, right after China (25.73%) and the USA (14.29%). 
From 2008 to 2018, BMW grew at a CAGR of 0.91% in this market, representative of 
Germany being a mature region for the Group. As BMW has successfully expanded to 
other geographies, in the search for growth opportunities, its dependency on the 
German market became smaller. Note that by 2008 the German market represented 
about one-fifth of the firm’s total deliveries, about one and a half times more than the 
current value. 
In our model, a CAGR of 2.34% for the Group’s deliveries from 2019 to 2035 is 
expected, driven by a growth in the German car market and the preservation of the 








2015 2016 2017 2018
Exhibit 30: Germany -
Number of Units Sold per 
Brand
BMW MINI






2014 2015 2016 2017 2018










2015 2016 2017 2018













more its dependency on the German market, with it being representative of only 11.60% 
of the Group's total deliveries by 2035. The increased presence in other geographies 
is, again, the major argument. 
As previously explained in the report, the demand for automobiles is forecasted through 
the analysis of the population growth, RCP and RR development. In the case of 
Germany, after analysing the development of the country’s population, RCP and RR we 
forecast that the German car market will grow at a CAGR of 2.30% from 2019 to 2035, 
compared to 0.97% CAGR of the past decade.  
Taking a closer look at the German RCP, it has been following an upward trend, from 
50.3% in 2008 to 56.9% in 2018. It is important to note that this is the highest value 
registered for any primary geography where BMW operates. A later adoption of e-hailing 
and car-sharing solutions and the historic German passion for autos are some of the 
motives. Having said this, we expect German’s RCP to converge to the current UK 
values by 2035, thus at a proxy 49.1% figure18. Note that the adoption of car-sharing 
solutions in the UK happened earlier and, therefore, we considered it as a relevant 
benchmark (RCP:48.80%, 2018). Despite German customers highly valuing the 
performance of the car, we still believe that the convenience and benefits of the sharing 
economy, particularly in the urban areas, and the environmental advantages of these 
solutions will change the German mobility paradigm within the next 15 years.  
The RR has also been following an upward trend. At the beginning of the period under 
analysis, a RR of 5.6% was verified versus current values of 6.1%. Germany is the region 
with the second-lowest RR figure (right after China, with 3.7%), for previously mentioned 
reasons. If cars are not further exploited one cannot expect figures as high as the ones 
in the US (RR: 14.1%, 2018) where car-sharing is a reality since Uber started to officially 
provide their services in 2011. Hence, considering Germany’s adoption of e-hailing 
solutions and the auto product-mix of the country we expect an RR of 10.2% by 2035 - 
still below current US values. With this, and considering a population CAGR of 0.05%, 
we arrive to a German car market growth figure of 2.3% CAGR, as previously mentioned. 
This result indicates that the growth in population and the RR are more than enough to 
compensate for the shift towards car-sharing services in this geography. 
Lastly, this growth figure is supported by a preservation of the current 9% market share 
in Germany - roughly the average value of the past decade. In Germany, Volkswagen 
(VW) is the leading brand, followed by Mercedes and, only then, by BMW. Nevertheless, 
as BMW is the most prepared brand to deal with the new WLTP regulations, we 
believe this will benefit the Group against current German competitors and new players, 
such as Tesla. Stricter EU regulations on CO2, adopted by April 2019, aim to reduce 
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carbon emissions by 37.50%, from 2021 to 2030. The 2021 target demands an EU fleet-
wide average of 95g of CO2/km (-27% from the previous target). Players such as VW 
have been struggling to meet these marks, which made its market share decrease from 
20% to 18% in Q4 2018. On the other hand, BMW is at the forefront of electrification, 
ahead of both VW, Daimler and Tesla. BMW is the leader in electromobility market 
share in Germany, with a 21% figure, followed by Tesla (11%) and Renault (11%). Both 
VW (8%) and Mercedes (5%) lag behind. As Germany prepares to ban the sale of new 
diesel cars by 2030, this will be crucial for the Group to preserve its position. Note that, 
even though we are optimistic regarding the future of BMW under an electrification shift, 
as new players enter the premium EV market, we see the scenario of a preservation in 
market share more likely than an increasing market share, being this the reason why we 
opted for a growth rate of almost zero. 
United Kingdom: Despite BMW’s acquisition of Rolls-Royce dating back to 1998, 
followed by MINI’s in 2000, the UK only started to be regarded as a primary market in 
2014, accounting for 9.68% of the Group’s total deliveries. Ever since 2014, the change 
in weight of the UK in BMW’s total deliveries was minor, it being a mature market for the 
Group. Nevertheless, it was the only geography keeping its weight in total deliveries even 
after the strong breakthrough of China. From 2014 to 2018, BMW’s sales in the UK 
rose at a CAGR of 3.05%, a strong positive figure given that the overall market 
presented a negative CAGR of -0.41%, during the same time span. In our model, 
once analysing the UK’s population growth prospect, the RCP, RR and BMW’s market 
share evolution, we forecast a CAGR of 4.52% for BMW’s deliveries in the region 
from 2019 to 2035.  
The UK’s RCP grew from 46.8% in 2008 to a current value of 48.8%, though not as 
much as in Germany and not as low as in the US. In the UK, the usage of e-hailing 
alternatives has been a reality for almost as long as in the US, despite a slower adoption. 
Thus, we expect the country to decrease its RCP towards US values, given both new 
customer mobility preferences and environmental friendliness of car-sharing. Likewise, 
by 2035 we expect RCP to be 43.0%. Once again, as a sharing-economy on the 
mobility spectrum implies a higher RR, we expect this figure to go from 6.4% in 2018 
to 11.9% in 2035, still lower than in the US.  
As for BMW’s market share in this geography, we believe the Group is well-positioned 
to preserve its circa 10% market share. Currently, BMW ranks third in the market, right 
after Daimler and the market-leader US automaker, Ford. Amid these figures and a 
surge in population growth, we arrive at the aforementioned CAGR for deliveries in the 
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United States: The US is the second-largest market for the BMW Group, with a weight 
of 14.29% in total deliveries, in 2018. From 2008 to 2018, BMW sales grew at a CAGR 
of 1.46% in America, having successfully penetrated the market. Similarly to Germany, 
the weight of US deliveries decreased ever since 2008 (18.82%) - as the presence of 
China in the Group’s figures was inevitable. Even though the US is the geography we 
are less optimistic in what concerns market share, our model still predicts a CAGR of 
2.26% in the forecasted period for the Group’s deliveries. An increasing population 
at an above-average rate and a quickly rising RR are the major drivers that lead us to 
believe the US car market will grow at 2.87% CAGR in the forecast period. 
When analysing the US car market, looking at the evolution of its RCP and RR, one can 
encounter the most developed geography in what regards the mobility of the future. 
America has the lowest RCP of all the primary developed economies BMW 
operates in, with only 37.3%. Plus, it also has the highest value of RR (14.1%). Such 
combination indicates e-hailing and car-sharing are a reality in the country for a long-
time. Services such as Uber, were easily adopted in the US and therefore its car industry 
evolved at a fast pace. Likewise, we expect America’s RCP to decrease at a smaller rate 
than it did in the past three years. This results in an RCP forecast of 33.2% by 2035. 
As for the RR, it has gone from 10% to a current 14% value - a massive upward trend. 
Given that a shared-car’s RR is six times more than that of a regular vehicle, we estimate 
that the US RR will reach 23.5% by 2035. For this reason, and a population CAGR of 
0.59% (2008-2018 CAGR: 0.20%), the US car market is expected to grow at the 
aforementioned 2.87%. For BMW in particular, amid a decreasing market share of 1 bps 
per year until 2035, the CAGR is lower (1.95%). 
With additional competition on the EV premium segment from US firms and higher 
protectionist measures, we believe the Group’s market share is deemed to decrease at 
a slow rate. BMW ranks fifteenth in what regards market share on the US (2.06%), right 
after VW (2.05%) and Mercedes (2.02%). Nonetheless, Tesla’s sprint is notable. It 
currently holds a 1.15% slice of the market, which corresponds to a YTD change of 
294.51%. Having said this, our model reflects that by 2035 BMW’s market share in the 
US market will correspond to 1.85%. 
China: The Chinese market is by far the leading market for BMW since 2013. By the 
end of 2018, about one-fourth of the Group’s deliveries were respective to China (4.59% 
in 2008). Between 2008 and 2018, the Chinese car market grew at a CAGR of 
12.66%. Yet, BMW was capable of doubling this figure by growing its Chinese 
deliveries at a CAGR of 22.97%.  
One of the major drivers of this success was the creation of BMW Brilliance 
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Brilliance China Automotive Holding Ltd. (CBA). This partnership started as early as 
March 2003, with the aim of producing BMW brand vehicles for the Chinese market. By 
October 2003 the first Chinese-made BMW was already being sold. Initially, both parties 
began by holding each 50% of the joint venture, yet BMW will buy an additional 25% 
for 3.60 billion EUR, in 2022 - making the Group the first foreign carmaker to take 
control of its joint venture company in China. This transaction will entail BMW 
Brilliance to be fully consolidated into the Group’s financial statements, thus adding value 
to the company. Additionally, this deal will help BMW lessen the impact of higher tariffs 
imposed by the current trade war, as it now plans to boost manufacturing capacity in 
China and expand local production of models including EVs. It also counters the potential 
exposure to possible Chinese retaliation against German automakers amid Huawei’s 5G 
exclusion as a supplier of 5G wireless equipment in the country. Such a competitive 
advantage is not held by Daimler, BMW’s major European competitor in the Chinese 
market - both firms hold approximately 2% market share in the region. Likewise, we are 
optimistic of BMW’s capabilities to continue to leverage growth opportunities in the 
premium and luxury car market in China, with reduced concern over possible 
implications from trade disputes. Our model estimates the Chinese auto market to 
grow at a CAGR of 3.77%. We expect BMW to outperform the market with a CAGR 
of 4.42%. Moreover, we expect China to represent a larger slice of the Group’s 
deliveries, 42.14% by 2035. Such values rely on our analysis of the Chinese population 
evolution, RCP, RR and BMW’s market share forecast.  
When considering the RCP in China, one must consider that the country holds the lowest 
value from all the primary regions of BMW (14.4% in 2018). Such a low number is 
justified by it not being such a mature market in what regards mobility. For example, 
second-hand car markets are relatively recent in the country. Despite, China’s ease to 
adapt its infrastructure to accommodate shared mobility, we believe the country will keep 
on lagging behind developed markets in terms of RCP and will converge more rapidly to 
a car-shared mobility spectrum. Thus, we forecast an RCP figure of 30.1% by 2035, 
about 3% lower than the forecasted value for the US (RCP: 33.2%). 
In 2008, a figure close to zero upheld for the Chinese RR. It is, therefore, the primary 
region for BMW with the highest growth for this ratio. Given the assumptions considered 
for the RR development upon car-sharing prospects we arrive at a figure of 6.6% 
for 2035.  
As the Chinese market matures and approaches markets such as the US, alongside 
existing car ownership and stage of highway infrastructure, we believe the potential for 
car sales to be robust. According to McKinsey, there is a stated consumer preference in 
China towards trading up vehicles. This is a positive indicator for the continuity of sales 
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increasingly concentrated as customers develop deeper loyalty to brands. Leading 
brands are taking nearly 80% market share, as it is moving towards consolidation. 
Studies confirm Chinese consumers tend to have only up to two to three brands in mind 
when setting out to buy a car. As the proportion of new buyers is declining attracting 
and maintaining the loyalty of existing car owners is becoming increasingly important. 
This can be an edge for BMW, since German, American, Japanese and British brands 
are perceived as providing high quality, safety, luxury, comfort and outstanding 
performance. As these brands dominate the high-end segment, we expect BMW to keep 
increasing its market share, yet at the slower pace of 0.02% (0.2% YoY historical 
average), reaching 3.11% market share by 2035 (2018: 2.77%). 
It is important to highlight the role of Rolls-Royce in the Group’s presence in China. The 
Chinese luxury car market grew 7% in 2018, and Rolls-Royce was one of the 
preferred brands. As previously mentioned, China became Rolls-Royce second-largest 
market and is expected to rise to number. The brand’s top luxury vehicles are gaining 
favour amongst ultra-high-net-worth Chinese customers, who are willing to pay for the 
extra personalisation options and comfort. 
Comparable Companies 
Before moving on to the BMW Group’s valuation, it is important to analyse the financial 
health of its most direct peers, Daimler and Audi. These big premium German carmakers 
fight locally and globally to gain market share and increase revenues. Thus, with very 
similar business units and structures, analysing these companies gives an overall picture 
of how the market is looking at premium cars. 
a. Daimler 
Both companies have faced recent major management and leadership changes, 
Daimler with the retirement of Dieter Zetsche, CEO for 13 years and BMW with its recent 
change of CEO. However, good things can come from uncertainty. Many expect that a 
change in leadership may lead to a reset of the companies and consequently to 
electrification initiatives. EVs high production costs are not completely covered by the 
price premium, which makes margins lower, and investors less optimistic. Additionally, 
both BMW and Daimler are obliged to take up significant development costs to expand 
EV production (BMW invested 1.4 billion EUR in 2018). From 2017 to 2018, BMW’s 
automotive profit before tax decreased by 20%, while Daimler’s decreased by 24%. 
Regardless, Daimler’s sales grew the most between the three premium German players, 
for the past five years. Since 2015, Mercedes-Benz cars deliveries grew at a higher rate 
than BMW brand’s sales. Despite the increase in deliveries, Daimler cars division 
experienced a decrease of -1% in revenues in 2018, which was not felt by BMW. 
Exhibit 45: Daimler’s Financials 
Source: Daimler AG Financial Report 2018. 
Values with respect to automotive segment 
 
Daimler 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
  Sales (k) 1,722  2,001  2,238  2,373 2,382 
  Revenues 73,584 83,809 89,284 94,351 93,103 
  EBIT 5,853 7,926 8,112 8,843 7,216 
  EBIT Margin 8.00% 9.50% 9.10% 9.40% 7.80% 
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This can be explained by the Group’s effort to launch numerous new vehicle models, 
both electrified and combustion, while Mercedes holds a far smaller product offer. BMW 
was the only German premium carmaker to counter the downturn in demand in 
China and the US, with increased deliveries in these regions. However, Daimler has 
had an EBIT margin 0.2% above that of BMW for the past three years.  
Daimler’s share price has suffered more dramatically than BMW’s, with the closing 
price in December 2018 dropping by more than a third when compared to 2017 
(2018: 45.91 EUR, 2017: 70.80 EUR, -35%). This accentuated drop is due to the 
leadership uncertainty mentioned above and the two-profit warnings, that resulted from 
increased expenses to comply to EU emission regulations, increased provisions to 
replace AC systems in old vehicles and trade war conflicts.  
b. Audi 
The Audi brand belongs to the Volkswagen Group, but it is still perceived as a premium 
car manufacturer. Audi is the brand with the fewer sales and revenues of the three and 
also the one with the least capacity to capitalize on sales (smaller average revenue per 
car delivered). However, its EBIT margin (7.9%) is slightly higher than that of BMW 
(7.20%) and Daimler (7.80%). The firm’s investment in a common engineering platform 
(MQB) allows for the production of several standardized car models. These platforms, 
adopted by all the major group brands, provide increased flexibility and reduced 
production costs. Meanwhile, VW is demonstrating a strong commitment to EVs by 
investing in the Modular electric drive matrix (MEB) which is the EV equivalent of MQB. 
This is the firm’s biggest hope on making superior profits on these cars. The MEB 
focuses exclusively on the production of fully electric vehicles. This contrasts with BMW’s 
decision to keep producing both fully electric and hybrid plug-in autos. The MEB is 
already bringing significant cost advantages to the VW Group in what regards battery 
price. In 2019, a company source stated that VW is buying batteries at less than the 
threshold for EV mass adoption (100€/kWh) - not officially confirmed. If true, this could 
be a significant threat to BMW’s EV leadership. 
c. Overall 
Regarding the geographical distribution of sales, the three automakers have a similar 
weight of unit sales per geography. The European market is still the largest buyer of 
German premium cars but may soon be surpassed by Asia, which is gradually 
gaining importance. Meanwhile, the US market, most mature, is gradually losing 
weight.  
In terms of profitability indicators, it can be noted that BMW is more efficient in using its 
assets to generate earnings, than its main competitor, Daimler. However, its ROA is still 
Exhibit 47: Audi’s Financials 
Source: Volkswagen group Financial Report 2018. 





Exhibit 48: Vehicle deliveries 
per region - 2018
Europe Asia US
 
Audi + Porsche 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
  Sales (k) 1,741 1,803 1,867 1,878 1,812 
  Revenues 53,787 58,420 59,317 59,789 59,248 
  EBIT 5,150 5,134 4,846 5,058 4,705 
  EBIT Margin 9.60% 8.80% 8.20% 8.50% 7.90% 
y = -0.0435x + 1960
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far from the peer’s median. BMW’s ROE and ROIC are also larger than Daimler’s, which 
means that BMW has allocated its capital to more profitable investment 
opportunities. Nonetheless, the company is still much below the industry average of  
12.93% and 3.03%, respectively. 
Despite having a smaller gross margin, meaning it utilises more direct resources to 
produce the same amount of sales, it has a much higher operating margin. The Group 
seems to be more efficient with respect to fixed costs, which overcompensates its 
higher variable ones. Thus, the company can generate more profit from a unit of sales 
than competitors. This profitability advantage is maintained after depreciation and 
amortization. In Exhibit 49, one can see that BMW’s EBIT margin is much above that 
of its comparable companies.  
In Exhibit 50, it is perceptible that the Group has constantly had lower revenues than 
Daimler. Yet, note that these figures consider not only the automotive segment. 
However, there is a steady growth of revenues for BMW, which is not true for the 
others. Additionally, the big German automakers have a serious issue of being overly 
leveraged. BMW’s debt out-weights its equity by 150x, while the automotive industry 
average D/E ratio is 2.5x. Such a leveraged position can be dangerous in case of an 
abrupt fall in the sales level which would make it hard for BMW to service its debt. 
Regarding the WACC, one can note that BMW is being discounted at a lower rate 
than the peer average. This implies that the market associates a lower risk to the 
company due to its low cost of financing and capital acquisition - A credit rating firm. 
Valuation 
Given the company’s strategy, market trends’ and peers’ outlook, the BMW Group can 
be valued. In order to do so, key captions are forecasted based on relevant value 
drivers, which are mainly related to revenue. To estimate BMW’s value, we used the 
Discounted Cash Flows (DCF) method, since, regardless of its limitations, this method 
reflects the main value drivers. The forecast19 was conducted until 2035 and from that 
year onwards a perpetual nominal growth of 1% was assumed, based on the inflation 
rate. 
a. Revenue Forecast 
Automotive:  The forecast of the Income Statement and Balance Sheet were mainly 
based on revenues since many of the captions were calculated depending on them. 
 
19 The firm’s financial statements were reformulated in core and non-core operations. The Automotive and Motorcycle 
segments were considered the true core operations. The Financial Services and Other Entities were considered non-core. 
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Exhibit 51: Number of Units 
Sold per Brand (Forecasts)
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Indicator BMW Daimler VW Median 
ROA 2,3% 1,4% 3,0% 3,0% 
ROE 8,7% 6,4% 12,9% 12,9% 
ROIC 2,8% 2,1% 3,3% 3,0% 
WACC 3,0% 2,6% 3,6% 3,6% 
Debt/EBITDA 8,5 12,5 5,0 8,5 
EBIT Margin 9,3% 6,1% 5,9% 5,9% 
FCF -2862 -7191 - - 
Gross Margin 19,0% 19,8% 19,7% 19,0% 
Operating 
Margin 9,3% 6,1% 5,9% 5,9% 
 
 








Hence, to forecast sales a top-down approach was adopted where each geographical 
region and brand were analysed separately. The goal was to have a picture of the Group’s 
total deliveries per geography. Meanwhile, to further understand the impact of each 
brand on the price-mix, the average revenue per car was adjusted since Rolls-Royce, 
BMW, MINI, and EVs have distinct market prices.  
For each major geographical area, Germany (12.50%), UK (9.60%), USA (14.30%) and 
China (25.70%), BMW’s total deliveries were forecasted based on each country’s 
population, passenger vehicles in use, new car registrations and BMW’s market share in 
the region. Namely, the future number of new car registrations was forecasted attending 
to the population, RCP and RR. Based on these, a conservative sales momentum was 
predicted for the Group’s automobile brands. By 2035, the company is expected to reach  
a revenue level of 97,422 million EUR. This implies a CAGR of 2.24% for the next 17 
years, which entails a slowdown in revenue growth when compared to the last eleven 
years (CAGR of 5.60%). We would like to stress that the company is well-positioned to 
capture revenue from the future trends mentioned before in the report, hence maintaining 
its market share in the most important markets. Nonetheless, the main contributor to 
revenue growth will continue to be the Chinese market, whose deliveries are expected 
to represent 42.14% of total deliveries by 2035 (25.73% in 2018).  
Based on the market price of IC BMW, MINI, and Rolls-Royce vehicles, and the respective 
non-IC versions, a weighted average of price is calculated considering their contribution 
to total deliveries. The computed price will be further influenced by the inflation rate (1%). 
Meanwhile, EVs will continue to gain relevance among passenger vehicles. Despite the 
expected decrease in their average price - due to increased competition and reduced 
materials costs - it is foreseen that these vehicles will continue to be more expensive than 
their IC counterparts. At the same time, we expect that the incorporation of autonomous 
features will have a small influence on the price-mix - the material costs related to radars 
and other components are already decreasing substantially in price. Consequently, the 
BMW Group is more likely to charge a slightly higher average price per vehicle predicted 
at 41,033 EUR for 2035 (34,467 EUR in 2018), which reflects a CAGR of 0.67%. 
Meanwhile, the final deliveries per region were calculated by multiplying BMW’s market 
share by the estimated number of new car registrations. Note that the number of new car 
registrations equals the total new cars sold per year. As previously mentioned, the RCP 
will gradually decrease, as people will have a lesser need to own a car, while the RR will 
gradually increase. Despite the decrease in RCP, the number of passenger cars, in total, 
will continue to rise as the population increases. At the same time, the increase in RR will 
contribute to a higher number of new registrations per year, which favours the Group’s 
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2,967,820 automobiles, which mirrors a positive trend (2018: 2,490,664; CAGR of 
1.56%). 
Motorcycles: The forecast for motorcycle sales was performed considering three main 
geographical areas, Germany (14.40%), Italy (8.50%) and the US (8.40%). Similarly to 
the automotive segment, the Group’s total deliveries were forecasted based on the 
country’s population, motorcycles in use, new motorcycle registrations and 
BMW’s market share. The future number of new motorcycles’ registrations was 
forecasted attending to the estimated population, RCP and RR. Regarding the RCP, the 
main markets have experienced a minor increase in the number of motorcycles per 
population, with the exception of the US. Meanwhile, there is a broadly spread increase 
in RR, felt more intensively in the US (+8.00% from 2016 to 2018). The increase in RR 
and population offsets the lower RCP, which leads to an increase in the sales of 
motorcycles. However, BMW is losing ground in the US and Italian markets, only 
increasing its market share in Germany. Given this, motorcycle revenues are expected 
to reach 4,821 million EUR by 2035, which showcases a CAGR of 4.19% for the next 
17 years, lower than the CAGR for the past 11 years (5.39%). 
Financial Services: Financial Services revenues were forecasted based on the 
number of contracts and return per contract. As the segment’s main revenue source 
is financing and leasing of autos and motos, the number of new contracts was calculated 
based on the units sold each year and the penetration rate of the its products. For a 
penetration rate of 70.73%, it is expected that by 2035, this segment will have a revenue 
of 40,789 million EUR, which has an implicit CAGR of 2.52% (5.95% for the past 11 
years). 
b. Gross Margin Projection 
As previously mentioned, carmakers in general, are suffering from gross margin 
shrinkage. The higher cost of production of EVs and AVs, and the costs of adaptation to 
new environmental laws, lead to a decrease in profitability. BMW’s automotive segment 
COGS represented 79.06% of revenues in 2018, translating into a gross margin of 
20.94%. The COGS is expected to equal 81.69% of revenues from 2019 onwards - 
gross margin of 18.31%.  
Improvements need to be undertaken so that EV models become as profitable as its IC 
peers. According to McKinsey, an EV costs, on average, 12,000 USD more to produce 
than an IC vehicle, batteries being the most expensive component. In 2015, batteries 
cost around 7,500 USD (373 USD/kWh). Yet batteries’ costs have already decreased to 
176 USD/kWh20, in 2018, which represents a 50% decrease in production costs. Elon 
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Musk, stated in June 2018, that Tesla’s batteries were close to reaching the cost of 100 
USD/kWh. This price has been mentioned as the threshold towards mass adoption of 
EVs. However, it was VW that, in September 2019, managed to push battery costs below 
this value by taking advantage of economies of scale21. If demand for lithium batteries 
continues to increase, Bloomberg expects a 94 USD/kWh price by 2024 and 62 
USD/kWh by 2030 (for a learning rate of 18%). This will allow carmakers to charge more 
affordable prices for EV while getting higher margins. As previously stated, this was the 
major rationale for our belief that EVs would converge towards the price of IC vehicles. 
Most of AVs are produced using LiDAR radars. A LiDAR radar’s price stands at 75,000 
USD, yet it is expected to cost approximately 2,000 USD by 2030.22 The decrease in 
costs is mainly explained by the increase in demand that will allow certain providers to 
reach economies of scale. Moreover, if there is a breakthrough discovery that allows for 
LiDAR sensors with solid-state design, its price can go down to a couple of hundred 
dollars. However, sensors are not the only additional cost of AVs. These vehicles will 
require special software, wireless networks, navigations systems, automated controls 
and more frequent maintenance. Thus, even if the sensor’s cost is expected to decrease 
significantly, autonomous cars will still have a higher cost of sales than current IC 
vehicles.  
Concluding, vehicle electrification, autonomous elements, digital experience 
improvement, and design are some of the premium vehicle differentiators that BMW is 
investing in. This increase in the number of features leads to higher COGS. In normal 
conditions, these higher costs are offset by charging premium prices. However, we 
believe that BMW capability to increase prices further is compromised by recent 
customer expectations. Consumers expect their vehicles to include several features per 
se, without being willing to pay extra for them (e.g. GPS and AC). As mass-market 
vehicles include more of these “premium” features, premium carmakers need to come 
up with innovative add-ons to keep charging higher prices. This market trend will 
ultimately limit premium automakers’ pricing power. Given this, we estimate a small 
decrease in BMW’s automobiles EBIT margin from 9.5% to 7%. 
Regarding motorcycles, a gross margin of 20.57% was estimated considering that 
the company has maintained this margin for the past ten years and we do not expect 
substantial changes. The Financial Services gross margin was calculated as an 
average of the past 11 years, including the financial crisis years to account for this 
possible scenario. Thus, we expect it to be in line with that of the past year and equal 
14.03% (13.96% in 2018). 
 
21 According to New York Times article: “Volkswagen Hopes Fresh Logo Signals an Emission-Free Future”. 
22 According to UBS autonomous report and Forbes, “How soon and How much?” article. 
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c. Discounted Cash Flow 
WACC Estimation: For the purpose of the DCF valuation, a single WACC discount 
rate was considered, amid BMW’s goal to maintain an A credit rating. We believe BMW’s 
capital structure to remain constant as there is no evidence of major changes to occur in 
the forecasted period. The Group’s debt corresponds to 67.79%, while equity amounts 
to 32.21% of the enterprise value. Exhibit 61 showcases the considered inputs. As 
previously mentioned, BMW’s shareholder structure is mostly composed of EU (58.4%) 
and US (35.5%) investors23. Therefore, in order to mirror the Group’s investor pool both 
geographies’ benchmarks were considered and weighted accordingly. The proxy used 
for the EU risk-free rate was the 10-year German Bunds (-0.20%) whilst for the US, the 
US Treasuries (2.12%) were considered. Once weighted, a final risk-free of 0.77% was 
obtained. The DAX24 and the S&P 500 were the indexes considered for the beta 
computation. BMW’s share price returns 82.37% correlation with the DAX, the highest 
when compared to any other index, and a 50.28% correlation with the S&P 500. In order 
to attain the firm’s beta a 5-year monthly window25 was used, resulting in 1.21. This 
reflects the cyclicality associated with autos. For the market risk premium calculation,  
the monthly German Bunds were subtracted to the monthly DAX returns and averaged. 
The same process was conducted for the US benchmarks, resulting in an MRP of 
5.72%26. From that, a cost of equity of 7.67% was computed using the CAPM. To 
determine the company’s cost of debt, the mid-YTM of an outstanding bond maturing in 
2029 was used (0.62%). Given the bond’s liquidity, years to maturity, and high credit 
rating we perceived its mid-YTM as fully representative of the Group’s cost of debt27. 
Lastly, given a statutory tax rate of 30.80% and BMW’s capital structure, a final WACC 
of 2.84% was attained. Our WACC estimation follows the market’s expectations yet 
being slightly higher28. 
Outcome: Since BMW’s ROIC and growth of unlevered cash flows have been constant 
in the past years, we applied a 17-year forecast horizon for all the necessary input factors. 
The free cash flows obtained were afterwards used to estimate the company’s enterprise 
value. Likewise, our DCF leads to a BUY recommendation for BMW’s Group potential 
investors at a target share price of 85.51, which represents a 15.24% upside to the 
current share price of 74.2029. Having 658 million shares outstanding, such results in an 
 
23 The total weight of American investors was 41.6%, including Asian investors (4.8%) and the Rest of the World (1.3%). 
24 Consists of the 30 major German companies trading of the Frankfurt stock exchange. 
25 The approach followed is the one recommended by the EY Switzerland “Valuation Best Practices”. 
26 Similar to 5.50% values suggested in the literature. 
27 According to the McKinsey Valuation book, for a company with an investment-grade bond, the YTM is a suitable proxy 
of the cost of debt. 
28 Analysts at Bloomberg presented a WACC for BMW of 2.70% as of Q2 2019. 
29 Source: Bloomberg. 
Exhibit 61: WACC Calculation 
Inputs 
 
BMW Beta (5 Years) 1,21 
Risk-Free Rate 0,77% 
MRP 5,72% 
Re (Cost of Equity) 7,67% 
Rd (Cost of Debt) 0,80% 
Equity Value 48,00 
Net Debt 101,00 
EV 149,00 
Debt to Equity 2,10 









Equity Value 56 232 
Shares Outstanding (M) 658 
Price Target FY2020 85,51 
Price Today 74,20 
Upside 15,24% 
 












equity value of 56,232 million EUR and an estimated enterprise value of 159,206 
million EUR. Lastly, once considering our estimated value for the WACC (2.84%) and 
long-term nominal growth rate (1%), the discounted terminal value computed is of 
122,314 million EUR, which represents 76.83% of the total company value, while the 
discounted operations correspond to 23.17% (36,892 million EUR).  
d. Scenario Analysis 
As previously detailed in the report, we expect the breakthrough from China to continue 
to present attractive growth opportunities and to increase BMW’s dependence on this 
market. In order to quantify the possible risks of a slower increase in the Chinese car 
market or a smaller market share capture, we decided to identify three main scenarios. 
These three different scenarios are the following: base scenario, worst-case and best-
case. The base-scenario is the one assumed throughout the report and the most likely 
to happen (60% likelihood). In this scenario, the Chinese car market and BMW’s market 
share are expected to continue to increase, but at a slower pace30 - market share will 
surge at one-tenth of the average of the last three years. In the worst-case scenario (15% 
likelihood) the Chinese car market would increase at a slower rate due to a smaller 
increase of the RCP – e.g. if customers begin to choose mobility services over a personal 
car sooner than expected. BMW’s market share evolution could also be below 
expectations – e.g. if the Group is more affected by trade wars than we perceive. 
Nevertheless, we still believe the automaker market share will increase given BMW 
Brilliance inner-country production. With these assumptions holding, a share price of 
59.56 EUR is obtained, translating into a 20.11% downside. Such would result in a 
SELL recommendation instead. Lastly, on the best-case scenario (25% likelihood) an 
increased growth in the Chinese car market and BMW’s market share was predicted. 
This could happen if there is a faster concentration of the industry and BMW continues 
to emerge as a preferred EU premium car brand. These assumptions result in a share 
price of 104.88 EUR, entailing an upside of 40.69%, which reinforces our BUY 
proposition. 
e. Sensitivity Analysis 
To test our model a sensitivity analysis of the price relative to several variables was 
conducted. Starting with both the WACC and the long-term growth rate, a sensitivity test 
with a 95% confidence interval was run. Note that these variables have a contrary effect 
on share price, with the WACC being the variable to which the price is more sensitive to. 
From our analysis, BMW share price ranges from 38.27 to 167.64 EUR. The lower 
 
30 Our model predicts that the Chinese car market will increase at a CAGR of 3.68% from 2019 to 2035, when compared to 
the last decade CAGR of 12.66%. 
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2,54% 106,3 118,8 133,0 149,1 167,6 
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Pessimistic 59,56 €  15% 8,93 € 
Base 85,51 €  60%  51,31 € 
Optimistic 104,88 €  25% 26,22 €  
Share price     86,46 € 
 
 








price would change our final recommendation to a SELL (downside: -48.67%). 
Nevertheless, as the majority of values do not change our final recommendation, we 
consider our model to be robust and within a reasonable range of values. For the WACC, 
amid a more dovish monetary policy from both the ECB and the Fed, we do not see such 
a scenario as likely, which brings additional confidence to our final recommendation. 
Furthermore, in order to get the impact of the RCP and market share estimation per 
geography, these variables are also subject to sensitivity scrutiny. For both the RCP and 
market share, we use a 50-bps range. For the primary geographies, where the firm 
holds a mature position, a change in market share has a higher impact on share 
price than a change in RCP. Such is verified for both Germany and the US, but not 
China. A higher RCP for China would have a larger impact on the share price than 
a market share gain. As China holds a large population, a small change in RCP 
translates into a significative increase in the number of new car registrations. For this 
reason, even if the market share does not grow as much, the increased car market 
overcompensates.  
When looking at the RCP’s sensitivity analysis, our recommendation would change to a 
SELL within the extreme lower bounds, which is very unlikely. It would require urban 
areas to change drastically their infrastructure to accommodate for a much higher share 
of e-hailing services and car automation. We do not see this as a viable possibility for the 
near future. Especially for China, a decreasing RCP is unlikely as it is not a mature 
market. Currently, the RCP in China is 13% when compared to the most developed 
mature region regarding mobility, the US (37%). 
Lastly, regarding market share, when looking at the lower bounds for all geographies, 
our final recommendation would change to a HOLD in case BMW’s market share in 
China would decrease 18 bps every year until 2035. Also, in case such would happen in 
the US. Nevertheless, for such to take place in the US, the brand would have to cease 
sales in the region by 2035, which seems highly unlikely. 
f. Multiples Valuation 
Lastly, a relative valuation was performed to better understand the market perception of 
BMW. For this valuation, the chosen comparable companies were Volkswagen AG, 
Daimler AG, Peugeot AG, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV, General Motors Co. and Volvo 
AB. The criteria considered for the comparable list regarded the firm’s size, profitability 
margins, business segments, geographical exposure and, credit rating profile. Thus, 
automakers such as Honda, Nissan and Tata Motors, were disregarded. 
The multiples analysed were mainly the EV/EBITDA and the Price-per-Earnings ratio 
(P/E). The EV/EBITDA multiple is highly reliable since it does not consider the capital 
 
 85,5 € Germany UK USA China 
RC
P 
1,0% 101,5 98,8 101,6 162,9 
0,5% 93,5 92,1 93,6 124,1 
0,0% 85,5 85,5 85,6 85,3 
-0,5% 77,5 78,8 77,5 46,4 
-1,0% 69,5 72,1 69,5 7,6 
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structure of comparable companies nor the susceptibility to accounting gimmicks. 
Generally, a high P/E ratio means that investors are anticipating higher growth in the 
future. Since investors are being pessimistic regarding long-term growth, the P/E ratio 
provided the most conservative valuation. 
The average EV/EBITDA for the past three years is 3.0x. Likewise, the average 
EV/EBITDA of 2018 equals 2.9x. Considering BMW’s EBITDA of 17,688 million EUR, 
and the average EV/EBITDA multiple of 3.0x, the implied enterprise value is 52,416 
million EUR. Regarding the P/E ratio, the average multiple for BMW’s peers for the past 
3 years is 7.9x, while the average P/E ratio of the same companies in the current year 
equals 6.3x. For a level of earnings of 7,115 million EUR and Net Debt of zero, the 
implied enterprise value obtained with the average P/E ratio of 7.1x is 50,470 million 
EUR. By considering both the EV/EBITDA and P/E ratio, BMW’s implied enterprise value 
is 51,442 million EUR. For a proxy of 658,122 million shares outstanding, the implied 
share price is of 78.17 EUR.  
In order to soften the fragilities associated with the DCF model, a final price of 82.5831 
was obtained by applying an equal-weighted average of the final prices from both 
valuation methods. Such reinforces our BUY recommendation, with a respective 




























Exhibit 69: Football Field
Final Valuation 
DCF Price 85,51 
Multiples Price 79,65 
Weighted Final Price 82,58 
Upside 11,29% 
    
Dividend 2020 3,50 
Total Return 16,01% 
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in millions 2018A 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F 
Core                           
Automotive                           




























Average price per vehicle (€) 34 467 36 654 38 149 39 285 40 070 40 503 40 585 40 318 39 702 38 737 37 422 37 935 38 450 
                            
Revenues 68 947 66 871 70 128 73 432 76 231 78 487 80 178 81 269 81 691 81 409 80 353 83 257 85 416 
Growth -2% -3% 5% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 1% 0% -1% 4% 3% 
Cost of Sales -54 510 -54 629 -57 290 -59 989 -62 276 -64 119 -65 500 -66 391 -66 736 -66 506 -65 643 -68 016 -69 779 
COGS (% Sales) 79,06% 82% 82% 82% 82% 82% 82% 82% 82% 82% 82% 82% 82% 
SG&A -7 880 -7 560 -7 928 -8 301 -8 618 -8 873 -9 064 -9 187 -9 235 -9 203 -9 084 -9 412 -9 656 
SG&A (% Sales) 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 
EBIT 6 557 4 682 4 910 5 141 5 337 5 495 5 614 5 690 5 720 5 700 5 626 5 829 5 980 
EBIT Margin 10% 7,0% 7,0% 7,0% 7,0% 7,0% 7,0% 7,0% 7,0% 7,0% 7,0% 7,0% 7,0% 
Taxes 1 583 1 198 1 172 1 162 1 159 1 294 1 317 1 307 1 299 1 291 1 280 1 322 1 350 
Effective Tax Rate 24% 26% 24% 23% 22% 24% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 
Loss from discontinued 
operations -33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NOPLAT 4 941 3 484 3 738 3 979 4 179 4 202 4 297 4 383 4 420 4 409 4 346 4 507 4 630 
                            
Motorcycles                           
# of motorcycles delivered 
(units) 165 566 181 038 188 360 195 854 203 429 211 011 218 692 226 565 234 454 242 466 250 520 258 746 267 052 
Average price per motorcycle 
(€) 13 125 13 256 13 388 13 522 13 658 13 794 13 932 14 071 14 212 14 354 14 498 14 643 14 789 
                            
Revenues 2 176 2 397 2 519 2 646 2 776 2 908 3 044 3 185 3 329 3 477 3 629 3 786 3 946 
Cost of Sales -1 741 -1 904 -2 001 -2 102 -2 205 -2 310 -2 418 -2 530 -2 644 -2 762 -2 882 -3 007 -3 134 
COGS (% Sales) 80% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 
SG&A -263 -286 -300 -316 -331 -347 -363 -380 -397 -415 -433 -451 -471 
SG&A (% Sales) 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 
EBIT 172 207 218 229 240 251 263 275 288 301 314 327 341 
Taxes -42 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
Effective Tax Rate 24% -53 -52 -52 -52 -59 -62 -63 -65 -68 -71 -74 -77 
NOPLAT 130 26% 24% 23% 22% 24% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 
 
 








                            
Financial Services                           



























Revenue per contract 4 934 4 984 5 033 5 084 5 135 5 186 5 238 5 290 5 343 5 397 5 451 5 505 5 560 
                            
Revenues 26 355 26 739 27 189 27 745 28 390 29 112 29 903 30 758 31 672 32 643 33 666 34 742 35 766 
Cost of Sales -22 677 -22 986 -23 373 -23 851 -24 406 -25 026 -25 706 -26 441 -27 227 -28 062 -28 941 -29 866 -30 746 
COGS (% Sales) 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 
SG&A -1 352 -1 408 -1 431 -1 461 -1 495 -1 533 -1 574 -1 619 -1 667 -1 718 -1 772 -1 829 -1 883 
SG&A (% Sales) 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
EBIT 2 326 2 345 2 385 2 433 2 490 2 553 2 623 2 698 2 778 2 863 2 953 3 047 3 137 
Taxes -716 -724 -737 -753 -772 -793 -816 -841 -868 -896 -926 -957 -987 
Result 1 610 1 622 1 648 1 680 1 718 1 760 1 806 1 856 1 910 1 967 2 027 2 090 2 150 
                            
Other Non-Core Items                           
Revenues 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cost of Sales 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
SG&A -63 -24 -25 -26 -27 -28 -29 -29 -30 -30 -30 -31 -32 
SG&A (% Total Sales) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other operating income and 
expenses 123 -181 -188 -195 -202 -208 -213 -217 -220 -221 -221 -229 -235 
(% Total Sales) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Result from equity accounted 
investments 
632 630 650 658 681 698 715 735 754 774 795 815 837 
(% Equity Investments) 24% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 
Interest Income 397 335 335 335 335 335 335 335 335 335 335 335 335 
(%Other assets) 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Other Financial Results 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
(%Financial Assets) 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
EBIT 1 146 816 828 827 842 853 864 880 896 914 934 946 961 
Taxes -353 -252 -256 -256 -261 -265 -269 -274 -280 -286 -293 -297 -302 
OCI -604 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 
Result 793 564 572 571 581 588 595 606 616 628 641 649 658 
                            
Financial                           
Interest Expenses -386 -464 -476 -489 -502 -515 -529 -543 -557 -572 -587 -603 -619 
(%Financial Liabilities) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Financial Result -386 -464 -476 -489 -502 -515 -529 -543 -557 -572 -587 -603 -619 
Tax Shield 119 143 147 151 156 160 165 169 174 179 184 189 195 
Result -267 -321 -329 -337 -346 -355 -364 -374 -383 -393 -403 -414 -424 
                            
Consolidated                           
Sales 97 480 96 008 99 838 103 824 107 398 110 508 113 126 115 213 116 694 117 530 117 649 121 786 125 129 
Cost of Sales -78 924 -79 516 -82 661 -85 938 -88 882 -91 451 -93 620 -95 359 -96 604 -97 326 -97 463 -100 885 -103 656 
SG&A -9 558 -9 278 -9 685 -10 104 -10 471 -10 780 -11 030 -11 216 -11 329 -11 366 -11 319 -11 723 -12 041 
Non-Core Income 1 203 836 848 849 864 876 888 904 920 939 959 972 987 
Financial Income -386 -464 -476 -489 -502 -515 -529 -543 -557 -572 -587 -603 -619 
Taxes -2 575 -2 084 -2 070 -2 072 -2 089 -2 251 -2 300 -2 317 -2 338 -2 362 -2 386 -2 461 -2 521 
Income 7 240 5 503 5 794 6 070 6 319 6 387 6 535 6 683 6 786 6 843 6 853 7 086 7 279 
Other comprehensive income -604 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 
Loss from discontinued 
operations -33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Comprehensive Income 6 603 5 685 5 977 6 252 6 501 6 569 6 718 6 866 6 968 7 026 7 036 7 269 7 461 
                            
Taxes 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 
Statutory Rate Germany 30,8% 30,9% 30,9% 31,0% 31,0% 31,1% 31,1% 31,2% 31,2% 31,3% 31,3% 31,4% 31,5% 
Reported Taxes -2 575 -2 084 -2 070 -2 072 -2 089 -2 251 -2 300 -2 317 -2 338 -2 362 -2 386 -2 461 -2 521 
Reported Tax (% EBIT) -26,2% -27,5% -26,3% -25,5% -24,8% -26,1% -26,0% -25,7% -25,6% -25,7% -25,8% -25,8% -25,7% 
Tax Shield 119 143 147 151 156 160 165 169 174 179 184 189 195 
Non-Core Taxes -1 069 -975 -993 -1 010 -1 034 -1 058 -1 085 -1 116 -1 148 -1 182 -1 218 -1 254 -1 289 
Operation Taxes -1 625 -1 251 -1 224 -1 214 -1 211 -1 353 -1 379 -1 370 -1 365 -1 359 -1 352 -1 396 -1 427 
Operational Result Before 
Taxes 6 729 4 889 5 128 5 370 5 577 5 747 5 877 5 965 6 007 6 000 5 940 6 156 6 321 




in millions 2018 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F 
Core Business                           
Automotive                           
Operating Cash 1 379 1 920 1 997 2 076 2 148 2 210 2 262 2 304 2 334 2 351 2 353 2 436 2 503 
% of revenues 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Inventories 12 462  12 342  12 943  13 553  14 070  14 486  14 798  15 000  15 078  15 025  14 831  15 367  15 765  
Holding Period 83 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 
Trade receivables 2 287  2 308 2 420 2 534 2 631 2 709 2 767 2 805 2 819 2 809 2 773 2 873 2 948 
Collection Period 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Trade payables 8 360 8 215 8 615 9 021 9 365 9 642 9 850 9 984 10 036 10 001 9 872 10 228 10 493 
Payables period 56 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Current tax -315  538  552  584  603  623  636  645  648  646  637  660  677  Deferred tax 1 037  
Taxes (% EBIT) 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 
Intangible assets 10 472  8 781  9 042  9 442  9 781  10 054  10 259  10 391  10 442  10 409  10 281  10 633  10 894  
Intangible Assets (% Revenues) 15,2% 13,1% 12,9% 12,9% 12,8% 12,8% 12,8% 12,8% 12,8% 12,8% 12,8% 12,8% 12,8% 
Development Costs 9881 8 201  8 460  8 859  9 196  9 469  9 673  9 804  9 855  9 821  9 694  10 044  10 305  
Intangible Assets (% Revenues) 14,3% 12,3% 12,1% 12,1% 12,1% 12,1% 12,1% 12,1% 12,1% 12,1% 12,1% 12,1% 12,1% 
Goodwill 33 33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  
Goodwill (# of transactions)                           
Other Intangible assets 517 517  517  517  517  517  517  517  517  517  517  517  517  
Other Intangible Assets (% 
Revenues) 0,7% 0,8% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,6% 0,6% 0,6% 0,6% 0,6% 0,6% 0,6% 
Brand-name right 41 30  32  33  35  35  36  37  37  38  38  39  40  
Brand-right (%Net Profit) 0,6% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 
Property, plant and equipment 19 372  18 521  19 143  19 751  20 199  20 483  20 603  20 559  20 339  19 943  19 363  19 729  19 899  
PP&E (%Revenues) 28,1% 27,7% 27,3% 26,9% 26,5% 26,1% 25,7% 25,3% 24,9% 24,5% 24,1% 23,7% 23,3% 
Other provisions 10 799 10 546 11 060 11 581 12 023 12 378 12 645 12 817 12 884 12 839 12 673 13 131 13 471 
Other provisions (% Op. Expenses) 17,3% 17,0% 17,0% 17,0% 17,0% 17,0% 17,0% 17,0% 17,0% 17,0% 17,0% 17,0% 17,0% 
Invested Capital on Automotive 27 535 25 649 26 422 27 339 28 044 28 544 28 830 28 901 28 740 28 342 27 693 28 339 28 722 
                            
Motorcycle                           
Operating Cash 43,52 47,95 50,39 52,92 55,51 58,16 60,88 63,70 66,58 69,55 72,58 75,71 78,92 
% of revenues 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Inventories 568  618  650  682  716  750  785  821  858  897  936  976  1 017  
Holding Period 119 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 
Trade receivables 167  173 182 191 201 210 220 230 241 252 263 274 286 
Collection Period 28 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Trade payables 348 370 389 409 429 449 470 492 514 537 560 585 609 
Payables period 73 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Deferred tax 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Intangible assets 95  73  76  80  84  88  92  97  101  106  110  115  120  
Intangible Assets (% Revenues) 4,4% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 
Property, plant and equipment 399  425 446 469 492 515 539 564 590 616 643 670 699 
 
 








PP&E (%Revenues) 18,3% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 
Other provisions 171 208 219 230 241 252 264 276 289 302 315 329 342 
Other provisions (% Op. Expenses) 8,5% 9,5% 9,5% 9,5% 9,5% 9,5% 9,5% 9,5% 9,5% 9,5% 9,5% 9,5% 9,5% 
Invested Capital on Motorcycle 754  759  797  837  878  920  963  1 008  1 053  1 100  1 148  1 198  1 249  
                            
Non-core Business                           
Financial Services                           
Operating Cash 527 535 544 555 568 582 598 615 633 653 673 695 715 
% of revenues 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Inventories 17  21 21 22 22 23 23 24 25 26 26 27 28 
Holding Period 0,27 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 
Trade receivables 91  149 151 155 158 162 167 171 176 182 188 194 199 
Collection Period 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Receivables from sales financing 86 783  89 375  92 045  94 794  97 626  100 542  103 545  106 638  109 823  113 104  116 482  119 962  123 545  
Growth 7,89% 2,99% 2,99% 2,99% 2,99% 2,99% 2,99% 2,99% 2,99% 2,99% 2,99% 2,99% 2,99% 
Trade payables 950 845  859  877  897  920  945  972  1 001  1 032  1 064  1 098  1 130  
Payables period 15 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Current tax -129  -1 523  -1 549  -1 580  -1 617  -1 658  -1 703  -1 752  -1 804  -1 859  -1 918  -1 979  -2 037  Deferred tax -1 258  
Deferred tax (% EBIT) 59,6% 64,9% 64,9% 64,9% 64,9% 64,9% 64,9% 64,9% 64,9% 64,9% 64,9% 64,9% 64,9% 
Intangible assets 403  432  440  449  459  471  484  497  512  528  544  562  578  
Intangible Assets (% Revenues) 1,5% 1,6% 1,6% 1,6% 1,6% 1,6% 1,6% 1,6% 1,6% 1,6% 1,6% 1,6% 1,6% 
Development Costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Goodwill 347 347  347  347  347  347  347  347  347  347  347  347  347  
Goodwill (# of transactions)                           
Other Intangible assets 56 73  74  76  78  80  82  84  87  89  92  95  98  
Other Intangible Assets (% 
Revenues) 0,2% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 
Property, plant and equipment 30  32 33 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 41 42 43 
PP&E (%Revenues) 0,1% 0,12% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 
Leased products 38 572  39 947  40 216  40 632  41 166  41 794  42 504  43 287  44 133  45 035  45 987  46 987  47 892  
Leased products (%contracts) 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 
Other investments 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Other Investments (%Revenues) 0,00% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 
Other provisions 875 875  875  875  875  875  875  875  875  875  875  875  875  
Other provisions (% Op. Expenses) 3,6% 3,6% 3,5% 3,5% 3,4% 3,3% 3,2% 3,1% 3,0% 2,9% 2,8% 2,8% 2,7% 
Invested Capital on Financial Services 
123 
212  127 250  130 170  133 310  136 646  140 158  143 836  147 674  151 664  155 803  160 088  164 519  168 962  
                            
Other Non-Core Items                           
Trade receivables 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  
Financial Assets 6 675  6 675  6 675  6 675  6 675  6 675  6 675  6 675  6 675  6 675  6 675  6 675  6 675  
Growth -16.2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Current tax 652  922 935 935 951 964 977 994 1012 1032 1055 1069 1085 
Deferred tax 5  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Deferred tax (%EBIT) 57,4% 113,0% 113,0% 113,0% 113,0% 113,0% 113,0% 113,0% 113,0% 113,0% 113,0% 113,0% 113,0% 
Other assets 11 816  11 816  11 816  11 816  11 816  11 816  11 816  11 816  11 816  11 816  11 816  11 816  11 816  
Growth 29,6% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Assets held for sale 461  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Intangible assets 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  
Leased products 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Investments accounted for using the 
equity method 2 624  2 777  2 864  2 900  2 999  3 076  3 150  3 239  3 323  3 410  3 501  3 593  3 687  
Growth -5,2% 5,8% 3,1% 1,2% 3,4% 2,6% 2,4% 2,8% 2,6% 2,6% 2,7% 2,6% 2,6% 
Other investments 738  738  738  738  738  738  738  738  738  738  738  738  738  
Other investments (% Revenue) 0,8% 0,8% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,6% 0,6% 0,6% 0,6% 0,6% 0,6% 
Non-current Financial assets 1 010  2 028  2 028  2 028  2 028  2 028  2 028  2 028  2 028  2 028  2 028  2 028  2 028  
Non-current financial assets (% 
Revenue) 1,0% 2,1% 2,0% 2,0% 1,9% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,7% 1,6% 
Other provisions 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Trade payables 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Other liabilities 20 416  20 416  20 416  20 416  20 416  20 416  20 416  20 416  20 416  20 416  20 416  20 416  20 416  
Growth 10,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Liabilities in conjunction with assets held 
for sale 62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Invested Capital Other Non-Core 
Business 3 485 4 523 4 622 4 658 4 773 4 863 4 950 5 056 5 158 5 265 5 379 5 485 5 595 
                            
Financial                           
Excess of Cash 9 029  9 340  9 669  10 017  10 342  10 637  10 902  11 132  11 322  11 468  11 564  11 965  12 303  
(% total cash and cash equivalents) 82% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 
Financial liabilities 103 
597  106 350  109 177  112 079  115 058  118 116  121 255  124 478  127 787  131 183  134 670  138 249  141 923  
Growth 9,5% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 
(D/E) 
180,0
% 183,3% 184,9% 186,0% 187,4% 189,5% 192,3% 195,9% 200,4% 205,9% 212,7% 214,4% 217,8% 
Pension provisions 2 330 2 612 2 928 3 283 3 680 4 125 4 625 5 184 5 812 6 515 7 304 8 188 9 179 
Growth -28% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 
Treasury Shares 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minority interests 529 533  537  541  545  549  554  558  562  566  570  575  579  
Minority interests (% Equity) 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 



























                            
Equity 57 559 58 025 59 037 60 258 61 400 62 332 63 048 63 551 63 777 63 714 63 329 64 494 65 149 
Transactions with Shareholders -2 715 -5 220 -4 964 -5 031 -5 359 -5 637 -6 002 -6 363 -6 743 -7 088 -7 421 -6 104 -6 806 




  2018 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F 
Core                           
Automotive                           
NOPLAT 4 941 3 484 3 738 3 979 4 179 4 202 4 297 4 383 4 420 4 409 4 346 4 507 4 630 
ROIC 20% 13% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 16% 16% 
Depreciation 4 982 5 318 5 084 5 255 5 422 5 545 5 622 5 656 5 643 5 583 5 474 5 315 5 416 
Depreciation (%PP&E t-1) 27,6% 27,4% 27,4% 27,4% 27,4% 27,4% 27,4% 27,4% 27,4% 27,4% 27,4% 27,4% 27,4% 
Operational Cash Flow 9 923 8 801 8 822 9 234 9 600 9 746 9 919 10 038 10 064 9 992 9 820 9 822 10 046 
                            
Invested Capital - Fixed Assets 31 205 27 840 28 737 29 777 30 584 31 159 31 497 31 594 31 429 30 997 30 281 31 023 31 471 
Gross CAPEX Investment -2 514 3 365 -897 -1 040 -806 -576 -338 -97 165 432 716 -742 -448 
Net CAPEX -7 496 -1 952 -5 981 -6 295 -6 228 -6 120 -5 961 -5 752 -5 478 -5 151 -4 758 -6 056 -5 864 
Invested Capital - Liabilities -5 688 -5 273 -5 530 -5 791 -6 011 -6 189 -6 323 -6 409 -6 442 -6 420 -6 336 -6 565 -6 736 
Net Investment from Liabilities -29 -415 257 260 221 178 133 86 33 -22 -83 229 170 
Invested Capital - NWC and Others 2 017 3 082 3 215 3 352 3 472 3 573 3 655 3 716 3 753 3 765 3 749 3 882 3 986 
Investment in NWC and Others -543 -1 065 -133 -137 -120 -101 -82 -61 -37 -12 16 -133 -104 
Investment Cash Flow -8 068 -3 432 -5 857 -6 172 -6 127 -6 044 -5 909 -5 727 -5 482 -5 185 -4 826 -5 961 -5 798 
                            
Free Cash Flow Automobiles 1 855 5 370 2 965 3 062 3 473 3 702 4 010 4 312 4 582 4 806 4 994 3 862 4 248 
                            
Motorcycles                           
NOPLAT 130 154 166 177 188 192 201 212 222 232 242 253 264 
 
 








ROIC 19% 20% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 
Depreciation 97 97 103 109 114 120 125 131 137 144 150 157 163 
Depreciation (%PP&E t-1) 25,0% 24,4% 24,4% 24,4% 24,4% 24,4% 24,4% 24,4% 24,4% 24,4% 24,4% 24,4% 24,4% 
Operational Cash Flow 227 251 269 286 302 312 327 343 360 376 392 410 427 
                            
Invested Capital - Fixed Assets 494 497 523 549 576 603 632 661 691 721 753 785 819 
Gross CAPEX Investment -49 -3 -25 -26 -27 -27 -28 -29 -30 -31 -31 -33 -33 
Net CAPEX -146 -101 -129 -135 -141 -147 -154 -161 -167 -174 -181 -189 -197 
Invested Capital - Liabilities -70 -104 -109 -115 -120 -126 -132 -138 -144 -151 -157 -164 -171 
Net Investment from Liabilities -31 34 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 
Invested Capital - NWC and Others 330 365 384 403 423 443 464 485 507 530 553 577 601 
Investment in NWC and Others 2 -36 -19 -19 -20 -20 -21 -22 -22 -23 -23 -24 -24 
Investment Cash Flow -175 -102 -142 -149 -155 -162 -168 -176 -183 -191 -198 -206 -214 
                            
Free Cash Flow Motorcycles 52 149 127 137 147 150 158 167 177 186 194 203 213 
                            
Free Cash Flow Core Business 1 908 5 519 3 092 3 199 3 620 3 853 4 168 4 479 4 759 4 992 5 189 4 065 4 461 
                            
Non-Core                           
Operational Cash Flow 1 799 2 368 2 402 2 433 2 481 2 530 2 584 2 644 2 709 2 777 2 851 2 922 2 991 
Invested Capital 
126 
698 131 773 134 792 137 968 141 419 145 022 148 786 152 730 156 822 161 068 165 467 170 003 174 557 
Investment Cash Flow -6 888 -5 075 -3 019 -3 176 -3 451 -3 602 -3 765 -3 944 -4 092 -4 246 -4 399 -4 536 -4 554 
Free Cash Flow Non-Core Business -5 089 -2 707 -617 -742 -971 -1 072 -1 181 -1 299 -1 383 -1 469 -1 548 -1 615 -1 563 
                            
FREE CASH FLOW -3 182 2 812 2 475 2 457 2 650 2 780 2 988 3 180 3 375 3 523 3 641 2 450 2 898 
                            
Financial                           
Financial Result -267 -321 -329 -337 -346 -355 -364 -374 -383 -393 -403 -414 -424 

























Investment in Net Financial Assets 6 164 2 729 2 818 2 912 3 056 3 212 3 378 3 557 3 751 3 958 4 183 4 067 4 332 
Net Cash Transactions with 
Shareholders -2 715 -5 220 -4 964 -5 031 -5 359 -5 637 -6 002 -6 363 -6 743 -7 088 -7 421 -6 104 -6 806 
Financing Cash Flow 3 182 -2 812 -2 475 -2 457 -2 650 -2 780 -2 988 -3 180 -3 375 -3 523 -3 641 -2 450 -2 898 
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The continuous expansion of electric mobility is deemed to revamp the 
automotive industry. New market trends, challenges and risks arise with it and 
will undoubtedly influence BMW’s valuation. For the purpose of the report both 
a qualitative and quantitative analysis on the sector were pursued in order to 
assess the impact of electrified mobility in the performance, product offering, 
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Motivation 
Electric mobility rapid growth is a central topic of analysis as it impacts BMW’s product 
offering, price-mix, performance and consequently the Group’s valuation. At a time where the 
private sector is proactively reacting to greener policies, through intentions of further electrifying 
their models, it is relevant to perceive what are the electric-vehicle (EV) major market trends, 
challenges and risks and how do those reflect in the firm. 
From 2014 to 2018, electric and plug-in hybrid car sales for BMW grew at a CAGR of 51.63%, with 
EVs representing a proxy 6% of the automaker’s total deliveries. Additionally, BMW is investing in 
transforming their product-mix, of which more than half will be fully electric models by 2023. In our 
model, we forecast EVs to represent 73% of the Group’s total deliveries by 2035, hence 
translating into a CAGR of 13.95%.  
Likewise, it is crucial to scrutinise the EV market development and to take a regional perspective, 
such that our forecasts for BMW’s electric1 deliveries per each primary market are portrayed as 
accurately as possible. 
EV Market 
In 2018, global EV new car registrations almost doubled previous year’s figures. The global EV car 
fleet was up 2 million and exceeded 5.1 million vehicles. Such portrays electric mobility rapid pace 
of development and supports electrification to rank as the second top priority for executives2 in the 
auto industry, right after digitalisation and connectivity. 
This boom has been majorly driven by regulatory measures and industrial policies and is expected 
to persist this way. Regulators views will likely continue to drive OEM’s agenda, which means the 
individuality from external factors from country to country will continue to lead to distinct 
 
1 Electric deliveries for the BMW Group encompass both fully electric cars and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. 
2 According to KPMG Executive Global Auto Survey 2019. 
 
 








regional performances. Accordingly, as there will never be a global industrial policy one cannot 
expect a uniform global technological agenda nor an alike drivetrain solution – which is reflected in 
our model, as each primary geography has different EV deliveries considerations. 
Among the major policies and regulations fostering the growth of EV adoption there are the fuel 
economy, emission standards, financial incentives (e.g. government subsidies) and city access 
restrictions. City access restrictions are already taking place in 20 major urban areas worldwide, that 
have announced to ban gasoline and diesel cars in the very near future: Oxford (2020), London (2025) 
and Paris (2030). 
Uber’s Clean Air Plan to Help London go Electric demonstrates these policies’ influence over the 
private sector. As Uber aims that all cars in the app are fully electric in London by 2025, the e-hailing 
company is assisting every Uber driver to move into an EV, by charging a minimal value of 15p per 
mile on every trip booked through the Uber app in London. 
These policy mechanisms intent to make EVs more affordable and, thus, more appealing to both 
private and business customers. Table I summarizes EV related policies in BMW’s primary regions, 
while Exhibits I and II depict the official dates each primary region announced for the ban of diesel 
car sales.  
 
 
   China EU US 
Regulations (vehicles) 
ZEV mandate ✓   ✓* 
Fuel economy 
standards ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Incentives (vehicles) Fiscal incentives ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Target (vehicles)  ✓ ✓ ✓* 
Industrial policies Subsidy ✓     
Regulations (chargers) 
Hardware 
standards** ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Building regulations ✓* ✓ ✓* 
Incentives (chargers) Fiscal incentives ✓ ✓ ✓* 
Targets (chargers)  ✓ ✓ ✓* 
Table I: EV Related Policies (* indicates policies were only applied at a province/local/state level) 
 
 








Note that without such incentives, fuel economy and emission standards would hardly be met in all 
major markets, particularly in the EU and China, as the EV market needs to grow substantially. For 
example, for EU fleet CO2 emission targets to be met, plug-in hybrids and battery electric cars 
market shares need to reach a combined 10% by 2025 and 22% in 2030. Given the challenges 
related to EV adoption, these must be considered alongside possible delays. 
Challenges and Mitigations 
To accelerate and ensure sustainable and profitable growth in the EV industry there are several 
challenges to overcome. Firstly, glancing the consumer side, the major barriers encountered for 
EV adoption are price (35%), followed by charging (24%) and range (18%). 
Price as a primary barrier reinforces the idea previously stated of the financial incentives’ relevance 
for the encouragement of EV adoption. If such encountering is not to be mitigated it could be a deal 
breaker for the abovementioned countries to reach their emission targets and successfully ban the sale 
of diesel cars on the mentioned official dates. If consumers are not appealed by EVs this gap can 
break the expected supply/demand linkage. 
Nevertheless, as EV prices cost of ownership converge towards their internal-combustion (IC) 
vehicles counterparts, price no longer is a barrier. We expect such to happen by 2025, with a slight 












Exhibit I: Ban on IC Vehicle 
Sales (Year)



















Our 2025 forecast is explained by the increased importance battery-related raw materials and potential 
shocks in the supply chain, given the role of lithium, cobalt and nickel. Limited natural resources 
access, availability and geographical concentration make us believe there can be, potentially, price 
spikes that will justify for EVs to cost more than ICs for longer. On this note, it is relevant to highlight 
we are optimistic that the need for critical raw materials will diminish as the 3R (reduce, reuse, 
recycle) framework gets into place. 
In what regards recycling, several countries have already set standards for battery waste 
management, such as the recycling rate for the entire battery. Additionally, there are efforts to 
develop a regulatory framework for environmental requirements on the design phase of battery 
products in order to maximise the recovery of materials at battery end-of-life treatment, while 
reducing costs. Such measures are positive in what regards lower EV prices in the future as well as 
raw materials’ supply sustainability to empower the needed EV market grow.  
On the second concern, the charging time and infrastructure, we believe this issue will tend to 
diminish over time. As the next generation of BEVs has a higher range, home and workplace 
charging gets more than sufficient. Plus, ultra-fast charge stations are expected to serve more BEVs, 
it is estimated that the time required for 80% charge will be reduced to only 30 minutes by 2025. 
Moreover, there are increased efforts over charging infrastructure policies. In the EU countries 
are required to set the deployment of publicly accessible chargers in 2020, which is expected to 
translate into one charger per each ten cars. In the case of China, the country plans to deploy 12,000 
stations to swap batteries and 500,000 publicly accessible chargers to serve a proxy 5 million EVs by 
2020. Plus, more than 30 cities in China offer incentives for private home and public charging. This 
will also mitigate range concerns and foster electric 1readiness. 
 
 








Lastly, there are structural barriers per se, especially among the provision of energy. Energy 
providers claim that infrastructure enhancement goes beyond implementing more charge points and 
that it must include the improvement of the necessary backbone to avoid power grid overloads and 
shortages of general power supply. In our view this is the most complicated challenge to mitigate and 
will be the major cause underlying a slower EV rate of adoption. 
Impact on Valuation 
Given the abovementioned considerations, Exhibit III summarizes the dates by which we believe the 
ban of diesel car sales will be effective by each primary market for BMW. Accordingly, by 2035 
Germany will be the Group’s primary market with the highest share of EV deliveries (97%), followed 
by the UK (76%), China (75%) and, lastly, the US (50%). Such translates into distinct CAGRs: 
Germany (16.25%), UK (17.87%), US (13.62%), China (17.75%). This being said, both the UK 
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